Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Moscow faced no less of a dilemma m its dealings with the Baltlcs The geostrategic problems created by the loss of the Soviet empn-e were enormous Vu-tually overnight, access to strategic defense assets m the Baltlcs had become a topic for negotiation wxth independent states
forces Throughout the Soviet period, the Baltic peoples had always regarded the troops as little more than an occupymg army Under Gorbachev, the Sovret Union had begun a general drawdown of forces throughout Eastern Europe, rank-and-file troops had begun leaving the Baltics as well By the time the USSR ceased to exist m 1991, the total number of Soviet/Russian troops m the Baltics was estimated at 130,000 ' As Russia rotated enlisted personnel out of the region, though, the Russian officer corps m the Baltics began to resist pressure to w&draw as well Most lived off-base w&t then families m comfortable apartments, many had been stationed m the Baltlcs for years The Russian press was filled vvlth stories of officers and then families retummg to Russia to live m tents --or worse --due to an acute housing shortage and reduced funding for the milrtary The many officers whose departure would comcrde with retirement faced even greater uncertamtles Clearly, the best alternative for m place," and pressed the Baltic governments to grant the officers and then fmrhes the right to permanent residency and housing Baltic officrals, of course, saw thmgs qurte differently Already concerned about the large mmorrty of Russran crvrhans mvoluntarrly "stranded" on thenterntones, they were loath to consider any concessrons to Russran mrhtary officers, whose contmued presence mrght constrtute a potentral "fifth column" and thus posed a grave threat to Russian interests were different [from those of the Baltlcs] because they wanted to achieve an agreement that would legmmlze the presence of the troops. at least temporarily It boded down to the fact that the Russian aim was to prolong the process as long as they could Our arm was to speed it up as much as possible For us, the mam issue was the date --when will the The Baltic governments were absolutely not ready to have a agreement for a certam time per-rod [during which] the presence of the troops would be legitimized by the agreement ' As the negotiations progressed through 1992. the issues under drscusslon began to acqun-e a more polmcal flavor the rights of Russian officers under Estonian or Latvian law, crlterra for determining ehgibihty for residence permits, transit across Lrthuama to the Russian mlhtary enclave at Kalmmgrad In public statements, Russian officials began to use words like "dlscrrmmatron" to describe Baltic policies toward the Russian mmority, lmkmg then concerns to Moscow's wilhngness to contmue pulling out its troops President Yeltsm hunself suggested that the pace of the withdrawal would depend on the extent of mtemauonal aid to finance the building of housing for returning officers As the three Baltrc states struggled for leverage against the Russrans m the withdrawal negotratrons, then unity had always provided a measure of strength to then effort As long as the issue could be described m terms of a pull-out of Russian troops from "'the Baltrcs", rt was afforded a higher vrsrbrhty mtematronally The August 3 1, 1993 wrthdrawal from Lrthuama changed the balance, and spotlighted the strategy of "Baltrc drfferentratlon" that Moscow had been pursumg for months Presrdent Yeltsin had signaled the drfferentration m a press conference followmg his first meeting wrth new U S President Clmton on April 4, 1993
we are completmg the wrthdrawal of troops from Lnhuama, as Lrthuama does not violate human rights and treats the Russran-speaking populatron wrth respect
As Latvia and Estonia violate human rights, since according to then national legrslatron national mmormes. mostly Russrans, are persecuted, and that mvolves basically Russrans, we will lmk the wrthdrawal schedule with the human rights sztuatron there, althou P we have adopted a polmcal decision to pull the troops out of the republics Lama's negotiations were contmually upset by the stumbling block of Skrunda, as the Russians continued to mslst on mamtammg the strategic radar site until 1999 Estonia, meanwhile, had sufferecj a serious setback m its dialogue wth Russia m June 1993, when the parliament m Tallmn adopted a law on aliens that seemed designed to exclude Russians Under the law, anyone hvmg m Estonia who was not already a citizen was reqmred to apply for a residence permit Those viho failed to apply or fouled to meet Estoman standards for granting such permits might put their contmued residence m Estonia at risk Russian reaction to the law was swift and sharp Foreign Minister Kozyrev sad Estoma "had taken a step along the road to apartheid "lo After bs return to Washmgton, on January 20, the President telephoned Latvian President
Ulmams to report Russia's acceptance of the offer Ulmams expressed his gratitude for the U S mtervehttlon, but also described the tough Job he would face m sellmg the deal to the opposltlon, / who were already leveling charges that the government had sold out to Russia under pressure from Washington Clmton mvlted Uhnams to send a delegation of opposltlon parliamentarians to Washmgton, where U S experts would explam the strategic rationale for keeping Skrunda open 23 The leaders of Latvia's major parhamentary factions, led by Foreign Minister Andrejevs, visited Washington February l-2 for an extraordmary round of meetmgs, mcludmg a session with the President, Vice President, and National Secuzlty Adviser Lake *' Nicholas Burns qescnbed it as "the ultimate dlplomatlc full-court press, " made even more effective, m the eyes of Latvian Ambassador Kalmns, by some multilateral packaging It was a crltlcal couple of days, because it allowed the parhamentarlans to go back and take a strong position on this And it was an example of U SEuropean cooperation, since there were German and Swedish &plomats present m the meetings at the mtite House Convmcmg the parliament that this wasn't Just a U S imtlative made people feel more at ease Because there was always a suspicion back then that the U S 1s making a deal with Russia, that 1t.s a big power accommodation and we're caught m the middle So if the Swedes said it was okay, and the Germans said it was okay, then obviously It wasn*t Just the superpowers dealing over our heads 25
Disarmed by the hq$-level meetings and a generous offer of U S and Swedish financial assistance (eventually totaling over $7 m&ion) to help with Skrunda's dismantlement, the The mam issues at that point boiled down to the rights of hvmg permits for Russran officers --how many could remam, and how would the review process [to determine officer to be excluded for security reasons] go on We wanted the process to be based on Estoman legrslatron So the foreign mmrstry worked out the proposal, and then the draft went to Merr who was obvrously the one to sign rt. and he added some personal details, the kmd of rhetoric that was necessary for a personal flavor So Carefully choreographed behind the scenes, the meeting between Presidents Clinton and Merr oCcurred m Rrga on July 6, 1994 NSC Senior Director Burns recalled the exchange President Clinton said 'how would rt be rf I offered to take a very reahstrc proposal from you on the troop wrthdrawal personally to President Yeltsm?'
And President Merr was all prepared he said 'Mr President, I accept your offer, and I will commumcate my proposal to you m Naples through your Ambassador. Mr Frasure " And, true to his word, Merl met with Frasure and Bob cabled [the proposal] to us from Tallmn to Naples, and we had rt typed up, and the President handed rt to Yeltsm And the President was able to say 'I've been able to work out with President Men, on the basis of my July 6 meetmg with hrm m Rrga, the folloyg offer And I can vouch for rts good offices and rts integrity and smcerrty Yeltsm's reaction to the Men letter (whrch the U S side had had translated mto Russran to faclhtate immediate drscussron) seemed posrtive In particular, the Estoman positron on Paldrskr , which moved away from then-earlier maxrmahst "no tenancy" stand and agreed to a twelve-month perrod of dismantlement after the withdrawal, was seen as a step forward Most importantly, Yeltsm promised Clinton that he would meet wrth Merr As the meetmg broke up, Burns headed for a telephone to call Lurk wrth news that the drscussrons had gone well, but first stopped to listen to the Jomt Clmton-Yeltsm press conference In his opening statement, Clinton noted a "promismg development m the Baltrcs " He described how he had passed Men's ideas to Yeltsm, whrch Yeltsin had promised to give his full attention to "I believe," the President concluded, *'that the differences between the two sides have been narrowed and that an agreement can be reached m the near future so that the troops Preszdent YeZtszn No I --nice question I like the question, because I can say no We took out of Llthuama --we removed 3 1st of August [1993] mth a drumbeat, and we're going to take that last soldier from Latvia Now Estonia [is a] somewhat more difficult relationship since there m Estoma, there are very crude vlolatlons of human nghts, vls-A-vls the Russian-speakmg population. especially toward mlhtary pensioners I promised Bill [Chnton] that I will meet w& the President of Estonia We're going to discuss these issues, and after, we're going to try to find a solution to ths question 32 Burns and others m the U S delegation were dumbfounded by Yeltsm's "nyet" m the press conference, since It diverged so strongly from the tone and substance of the private discussion on the Baltxs \lth Clinton Although the outcome of the meeting was positive --Yeltsin had, after all, agreed to meet with Men --the "nyet" hung m the air like a bad odor Burns hurried to call Lmk, who had been watching the press conference on CNN As Lmk recalled it
We were rather surprised,, because we thought they would have given at least a more posltlve outcome or that the Russians wouldn't say anything pubhcly and keep a lower profile But obviously they had a rather strong reactlon It became one of the major issues --the press [m Estoma] became focused on the apparent contradlctlon between the American and Russian view of what should be done 33 U S officials felt that the best way to get beyond the negative perception left by the Naples press conference was to ensure that Yeltsin kept his word to schedule a meeting \ylth Men $0 that end, Clinton wrote Yeltsin a follow-up letter the week after their meeting urging him to schedule the meetmg as soon as possible and fulfill his pledge to get the troops out We were informed first by the Americans and later by the Russians that there \vlll probably be a meeting between the two Presidents But the Russians didn't tell us the date Then it somehow melted out from somewhere that it might be the 26th of July But there was no letter from the Russians requesting to come to Moscow --no letter from Yeltsin, no letter from anybody 35 Despite the absence of a formal mvltatlon to meet, the Russian-Estonian working-level talks were reconstituted to prepare the groundwork for a meeting, headed on the Estoman side by [He] very skillfully changed the atmosphere totally, by speaking of the cultural and historical point of Russmn-Estoman relations, and turned the tables The dlscusslon then took a more relaxed turn, and Yeltsm at some point said "well, what seems to be the problem, then?" And so we tried, uqth Kozyrev, to explam what the problem was, and to Yeltsin it didn't seem to be a very big problem 3g
As Men described It to Yeltsin, Estoma's major concern was over its sovereign right to determine which of the Russian officers seeking permanent residence rmght constitute a threat to Estonia's security Although as an issue of prmclple this did not seem to pose a major problem to the Russian President, the details were complicated, and neither Merl nor Yeltsin was prepared for any m-depth negotiating on the subject It was suggested that the two Presidents break for a late lunch, leaving their foreign mmlsters to work out a resolution For the next several hours, Lmk and Kozyrev negotiated the final terms of the side agreement to the withdrawal treaty covering the "social guarantees" for the Russian mmorlty m Estonia, reporting back mternuitently to Merl and Yeltsin, who added their own comments For Lmk, it was the chance to finish the deal once and for all We hammered it together m very broad terms. and not m very good legal language But we also had a very clear understanding that this was an opportunrty for us If you are the President of the U S , to meet with Yeltsin is not so difficult posslblhty " If you are the Estoman President, it's almost excluded as a By the time the last compromise was struck, it was early evemng m Moscow Reporters were summoned to a hastily arranged slgmng ceremony, where Merl and Yeltsin put then-signatures to the agreement on the troop pullout, thereby formahzmg the Russian commitment to complete the withdrawal by August 3 1, and to the agreement on social guarantees that had literally Just been concluded 'I Yeltsin later gave the press his mterpretatlon of how the long-&sputed issues p had finally been worked out West European reaction was also sharply crmcal, promptmg the Estomans to submit the law to the Council of Europe and the CSCE for comment Estoma subsequently modified the law m accordance with the European recommendations, but the Imgermg damage done --both by the orlgmal law, and by Moscow's reaction --further polsoned the atmosphere of the Russian-Estoman dlscusslons l3 Adrian Bndge, 'In the Baltics, Hugh Anxiety," The Independent, Apnl 1994 " Ibzd Followmg formal protests, Russian officials humed to clarify that Kozyrev had been referrmg to countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States --a groupmg that did not mclude the Baltlcs But the damage to the psychologlcal atmosphere surroundmg the withdrawal talks was already done, m much the same way that Estoma's redraft of the Law on Ahens never full] erased the unpresslon of anti-Russmn bias that the mmal draft had conveyed l5 N Muslyenko, 'Estonia Stands Its Ground, and So Does Rusna," Pravda, March 10, 1994, p 1 l6 Carl Blldt, "The Baltic Litmus Test," Forezgn Affazrs, September/October 1994, p 72 l7 Strobe Talbott, mtervlew by the author, March 26, 1996 l8 Nicholas Burns, mtervlew by the author, Februar) 20, 1996 l9 The amendments m question were contamed m P L 102-5 11 (The Freedom Support Act) as well as forei_= aid approprlatlons leglslatlon for FY 1993 (P L 102-39 1 j Amendments hnkmg contmued aid to the troop withdrawal were adopted m approprlatlons for FY1994 and FY 1995, as &ell The leglslatlon required the President to certify that "substantial withdrawal" had occurred, or that a tunetable for withdrawal had been reached between Russia and the Baltic states " Nicholas Burns, mtervlew by the author, February 20, 1996 " Amb O~ars Kalnms, mtervlew by the author, March 1, 1996 " Xlcholas Burns, mten lew bq the author, February 20. 1996 23 Author's mtemlews with Klcholas Eums, February 20, 1996 and Amb Oars Kalnms, March 1, 1996 " In other meetmgs, diplomats from Germany and Sweden provided their capitals' view on the benefits of the Skrunda agreement Durmg the visit, U S officials agreed to provide fundmg for the demohtlon of an uncompleted 12-story radar tower that dommated the countryside around Skrunda, the Latvian delegation stressed the nnportance of the demohtlon as a visible demonstranon to the Latvmn people that the Skrunda agreement \+as not a one-sided deal " Amb OJars Kalnms, mtervlew bJ the author, 
